Machine learning algorithms are increasingly involved in sensitive decision-making process with adversarial implications on individuals. This paper presents mdfa, an approach that identifies the characteristics of the victims of a classifier's discrimination. We measure discrimination as a violation of multi-differential fairness. Multi-differential fairness is a guarantee that a black box classifier's outcomes do not leak information on the sensitive attributes of a small group of individuals. We reduce the problem of identifying worst-case violations to matching distributions and predicting where sensitive attributes and classifier's outcomes coincide. We apply mdfa to a recidivism risk assessment classifier and demonstrate that individuals identified as African-American with little criminal history are three-times more likely to be considered at high risk of violent recidivism than similar individuals but not African-American.
Introduction
Machine learning algorithms are increasingly used to support decisions that could impose adverse consequences on an individual's life: for example in the judicial system, algorithms are used to assess whether a criminal offender is likely to recommit crimes; or within banks to determine the default risk of a potential borrower. At issue is whether classifiers are fair [Calsamiglia, 2009] i.e., whether classifiers' outcomes are independent of exogenous irrelevant characteristics or sensitive attributes like race and/or gender. Abundant examples of classifiers' discrimination can be found in diverse applications ( [Atlantic, 2016; ProPublica, 2016] ). ProPublica ([ProPublica, 2016] ) reported that COMPAS machine learning based recidivism risk assessment tool assigns disproportionately higher risk to African-American defendants than to Caucasian defendants.
Establishing contestability is challenging for potential victims of machine learning discrimination because (i) many assessment tools are proprietary and usually not transparent; and (ii) a precedent in United States case law places the burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate disparate treatmentto establish that characteristics irrelevant to the task affect the algorithm's outcomes (Loomis vs. the State of Wisconsin [vs. State of Wisconsin, 2016] ). Identifying the definitive characteristics of a classifier's discrimination empowers the victims of such discrimination. Moreover, a classifier's user needs warnings for individual instances in which severe profiling/discrimination has been detected. In this paper, we present a theoretical framework (multi-differential fairness) and a practical tool (mdfa) to characterize the individuals who can make a strong claim for being discriminated against.
To demonstrate a classifier's disparate treatment, we need to separate its discrimination from the social biases already encoded in the data. We define a classifier as multidifferentially fair if there is no subset of the feature space for which the classifier's outcomes are dependent on sensitive attributes. For any sub-population, disparate treatment is then measured as the maximum-divergence distance between the prior and posterior distributions of sensitive attributes.
mdfa audits for the worst-case violations of multidifferential fairness. Theoretically, our construction relies on a reduction to both matching distribution and agnostic learning problems. First, in order to neutralize the socialbiases encoded in the data, we re-balance it by minimizing the maximum-mean discrepancy between distributions conditioned on different sensitive attributes. Secondly, we show that violations of differential fairness is a problem of finding correlations between sensitive attributes and classifier's outcomes. Therefore, mdfa searches for instances of violation of multi-differential fairness by predicting where in the features space the binary values of sensitive attributes and classifier's outcomes coincide. Lastly, worst-case violations are extracted by incrementally removing the least unfair instances. This paper makes the following contributions:
• The proposed multi-differential fairness framework is the first attempt to identify disparate treatment for groups of individuals as small as computationally possible.
• mdfa efficiently identifies the individuals who are the most severely discriminated against by black-box classifiers.
• We apply mdfa to a case study of a recidivism risk assessment in Broward County, Florida and find a subpopulation of African-American defendants who are three times more likely to be considered at high risk of violent recidivism than similar individuals of other races.
• We apply mdfa to three other datasets related to crime, income and credit predictions and find that classifiers, even after being repaired for aggregate fairness, do discriminate against smaller sub-populations. Related Work In the growing literature on algorithmic fairness (see [Chouldechova and Roth, 2018] for a survey), this paper relates mostly to three axes of work. First, our paper, as in [Hébert-Johnson et al., 2017; Kearns et al., 2017] provides a definition of fairness that protects group of individuals as small as computationally possible. Empirical observations in [Kearns et al., 2017; Dwork et al., 2012] support defining fairness at the individual level since aggregate level fairness cannot protect specific sub-populations against severe discrimination.
Secondly, prior contributions on algorithmic disparate treatment [Zafar et al., 2017] have focused on whether sensitive attributes are used directly to train a classifier. This is a limitation when dealing with classifiers whose inputs are unknown. Differential fairness is inspired by differential privacy [Dwork et al., 2014] and offers a general framework to measure whether a classifier exacerbates the biases encoded in the data. Reinterpretations of fairness as a privacy problem can be found in [Jagielski et al., 2018; Foulds and Pan, 2018] , but none of those contributions make a connection to disparate treatment. Similar to prior work on disparate impact [Feldman et al., 2015; Chouldechova, 2017] there is a need to re-balance the distribution of features conditioned on sensitive attributes. Our kernel matching technique deals with covariate shift [Gretton et al., 2009; Cortes et al., 2008] , and has been used in domain adaptation (see e.g. [Mansour et al., 2009] ) and counterfactual analysis (e.g. [Johansson et al., 2016] ).
To the extent of our knowledge, there is no existing work on characterizing the most severe instances of algorithmic discrimination. However, recent contributions offer approaches to bolster individual recourse. For example, [Ustun et al., 2018; Russell, 2019] develop algorithms to answer what-if questions. However, unlike mdfa, these approaches do not account for the fact that individuals with different sensitive attributes are not drawn from similar distributions.
Individual and Multi-Differential Fairness
Preliminary An individual i is defined by a tuple ((x i , s i ), y i ), where x i ∈ X denotes i's audited features; s i ∈ S denotes the sensitive attributes; and y i ∈ {−1, 1} is a classifier f 's outcome. The auditor draws m samples
Features in X are not necessarily the ones used to train f . First, the auditor may not have access to all features used to train f . Secondly, the auditor may decide to deliberately leave out some features used to train f out of X because those features should not be used to define similarity among individuals. For example, if f classifies individuals according to their probability of repaying a loan, the auditor may consider that zipcode (correlated with race) should not be an auditing feature, although it was used to train f .
Assumptions In our analysis we assume that the distributions of auditing features conditioned on sensitive attributes have common support. Assumption 1. For all x ∈ X , P r[S|X = x] > 0.
Individual Differential Fairness
We define differential fairness as the guarantee that conditioned on features relevant to the tasks, a classifier's outcome is nearly independent of sensitive attributes:
The parameter δ controls how much the distribution of the classifier's outcome Y depends on sensitive attributes S given that auditing feature is x; larger value of δ implies a less differentially fair classifier. Differential Fairness and Disparate Treatments A δ− differential fair classifier f bounds the disparity of treatment between individuals with different sensitive attributes, the disparity being measured by the maximum divergence between the distributions P r(Y |S = s, x) and P r(Y |S = s, x):
Relation with Differential Privacy Differential fairness re-interprets disparate treatment as a differential privacy issue [Dwork et al., 2014] by bounding the leakage of sensitive attributes caused by Y given what is already leaked by the auditing features x. Formally, the fairness condition (1) bounds the maximum divergence between the distributions P r(S|Y, x) and P r(S|x) by δ.
Individual Fairness Def. (2.1) is an individual level definition of fairness, since it conditions the information leakage on auditing features x. Compared to the notion of individual fairness [Dwork et al., 2012] , individual differential fairness does not require an explicit similarity metric. This is a strength of our framework since defining a similarity metric has been the main limitation of applying the concept of individual fairness [Chouldechova and Roth, 2018] .
Multi-differential fairness
Although useful, the notion of individual differential fairness cannot be computationally efficiently audited for. Looking for violations of individual differential fairness will require searching over a set of 2 |X | individuals. Moreover, a sample from a distribution over X × S × {−1, 1} has a negligible probability to have two individuals with the same auditing features x but different sensitive attributes s.
Therefore, we relax the definition of individual differential fairness and impose differential fairness for sub-populations. Formally, C denotes a collection of subsets or group of individuals G in X . The collection C α is α-strong if for G ∈ C and y ∈ {−1,
fair with respect to S if ∀s ∈ S, ∀y ∈ {−1, 1} and ∀G ∈ C α :
Multi-differential fairness guarantees that the outcome of a classifier f is nearly mean-independent of protected attributes within any sub-population G ∈ C α . The fairness condition in Eq. 2 applies only to subpopulations with P r[Y = y & x ∈ G] ≥ α for y ∈ {−1, 1}. This is to avoid trivial cases where {x ∈ G & Y = y} is a singleton for some y, implying δ = ∞.
Collection of Indicators. We represent the collection of sub-populations C as a family of indicators: for G ∈ C, there is an indicator c : X → {−1, 1} such that c(x) = 1 if and only if x ∈ G. The relaxation of differential fairness to a collection of groups or subpopulation is akin to Kearns et al., 2017; Hébert-Johnson et al., 2017] . C α is the computational bound on how granular our definition of fairness is. The richer C α , the stronger the fairness guarantee offers by Def. 2.2. However, the complexity of C α is limited by the fact that we identify a sub-population G via random samples drawn from a distribution over X × S × {−1, 1}.
Fairness Diagnostics: Worst-case violations
The objective of mdfa is to find the sub-populations with the most severe violation of multi-differential fairness -that is to solve for s ∈ S and y ∈ {−1, 1}
Our approach succeeds at tackling three challenges: (i) if C α is large, an auditing algorithm linearly dependent on |C| can be prohibitively expensive; (ii) the data needs to be balanced conditioned on sensitive attributes; (iii) finding efficiently the most-harmed sub-population implies that we can predict a function c ∈ C α for which we do not directly observe values c(x).
Reduction to Agnostic Learning
First, we reduce the problem of certifying for the lack of differential fairness to a agnostic learning problem.
Multi Differential Fairness for Balanced Distribution
In this section, we assume that for any s ∈ S, the conditional distributions p(x|S = s) and p(x|S = s) are identical. This is not realistic for many datasets, but we will show how to handle unbalanced data in the next section. A balanced distribution does not leak any information on whether a sensitive attribute is equal to s: P r[S = s|x] = P r[S = s|x]. A violation of (C α , δ)-multi differential fairness simplifies then to a sub-population G ∈ C α , a y ∈ {−1, 1} and s ∈ S such that
with γ = α e δ /(1 + e δ ) − 1/2 . γ combines the size of the sub-population where a violation exists and the magnitude of the violation. We call a γ− unfairness certificate any triple (G, y, s) that satisfies Eq. (4). Further we postulate that f is γ−unfair if and only if such certificate exists. Unfairness for balanced distributions is equivalent to the existence of sub-populations for which sensitive attributes can be predicted once the classifier's outcomes are observed.
Searching for γ-unfairness certificate reduces to mapping the auditing features {x i } to the labels {s i y i }.
Lemma 3.1. Let s ∈ S. Suppose that the data is balanced. f is γ− multi-differential unfair for y ∈ {−1, 1} if and only there exists c ∈ C α such that P r[rSY = c] ≥ 1 − ρ(y) + 4γ, where r = sign(y) and ρ(y) = P r[S = rY ].
Lemma 3.1 allows us to reduce searching for a (G, y, s) unfairness certificate to predicting where sensitive attribute and outcomes of f (if y = 1) or outcomes of ¬f (if y = −1) coincide. Our proposed approach is to solve the following empirical loss minimization:
where l(.) is a 0 − 1 loss function and Reg(.) a regularizer.
The following result shows that (i) our reduction to a learning problem leads to an unbiased estimate of γ ; (ii) there is a computational limit on how granular multi-differential fairness can be, since for many concept classes C agnostic learning is a NP-hard problem ( [Feldman et al., 2012] ).
(i) There exists an algorithm that by using
O(log(|C, log(
(ii) C is agnostic learnable: there exists an algorithm that with O(log(|C, log(
Unbalanced Data
Imbalance Problem Multi-differential fairness measures the max-divergence distance between the posterior distribution P r(S|Y, x) and the prior one P r(S|x). Therefore, it requires knowledge of P r(S|x). In the previous section, we circumvent the issue by assuming P r[S = s|x] = 1/2. To generalize our approach, we propose to rebalance the data with the following weights: for s ∈ S, w s (x, s) = P r[S = s|x]/P r[S = s|x] and for s ′ = s, w s (x, s ′ ) = 1. Once reweighted, the conditional distributions P r w (X|S = s) and P r w (X|S = s) are identical and our learning reduction from the previous section applies.
However, in practice we do not have direct access to w s . One approach is to directly estimate the density P [S = s|x]. This method is used in propensityscore matching methods ([Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983] ) in the context of counterfactual analysis. But, exact or estimated importance sampling results in large variance in finite sample ( [Cortes et al., 2010] ). Instead, we use a kernel-based matching approach ([Gretton et al., 2009] and [Cortes et al., 2008] ). Our method considers real-value classification h : X → R such that c(x) is equal to the sign of h 1 .
The loss function l(h, sy) in Eq. (5) is assumed to be convex. Our setting includes, for example, support vector machine and logistic classification. The following result bounds above the change in the solution of Eq. (5) when changing the weighting scheme from u to w. Lemma 3.3. Let φ be a feature mapping and k be its associated kernel with k(x, x ′ ) = φ(x), φ(x ′ ) and ||k|| ∞ < κ < ∞. Suppose that in Eq. (5), Reg(h) = λ c ||g|| 2 k and that for x ∈ X , h(x) = h|k(x, .) . Suppose that l is σ− Lipchitz in its first argument. Denote h u and h w the solutions of the risk minimization Eq. (5) with weights u and w respectively. Then,
where cond(k) is the condition number of the Gram matrix of k and G k (u, w) is the maximum mean discrepancy between the distributions weighted by u and w:
Note that when the distribution is weighted with the importance sampling w s , the maximum mean discrepancy of P r(X|S = s) and P r(X|S = s) is zero. By minimizing the maximum-mean discrepancy G k (u, w s ), we minimize an upper bound on the pointwise difference between h u and h ws , that is the difference between the unfairness certificate we choose with weigths u and the one we would have chosen if P r(X|S = s) = P r(X|S = s). Therefore, mdfa solves:
In our implementation, the feature representation φ is learned via a neural network that is then shared with both tasks of minimizing the re-weighted certifying risk and the empirical counterpart G k (u, s) of the maximum mean discrepancy between P r(X|S = s) and P r(X|S = s). The following result bounds above the bias in mdfa's estimate of γ: Theorem 3.4. Let ǫ > 0 and η ∈ (0, 1). 
Worst-Case Violation
Solving the empirical minimization Eq. (6) allows certifying whether any black box classifier is multi-differential fair, but the solution of Eq. (6) does not distinguish a large sub-population S with low value of δ from a smaller subpopulation with larger value of δ. For example, consider two sub-populations of same size G 0 and G δ for δ > 0. Assume that there is no violation of multi-differential fairness on G 0 , but a δ− violation on G δ . The risk minimization Eq. 6 will pick indifferently G δ and G δ ∪ G 0 as unfairness certificates, although G 0 mixes the violation G δ with a sub-population without any violation of differential fairness.
ui(xi) 6: t ← t + 1, uit ← uit + uiξ if ai = yi and yi = y. 7: end while 8: Return ln(δt).
Worst-Case Violation Algorithm (WVA) At issue in the previous example is that for the sub-population G 0 , choosing c = 1 or c = −1 will lead to the same empirical risk Eq. 6. To force c(x) = −1 for x ∈ G 0 , our approach is to put a slightly larger weight on samples whenever s i = y i . Now the empirical risk is smaller for c = −1 wherever there is no violation of multi differential fairness. More generally, our worstviolation algorithm 1 iteratively increases by 1+ξt the weight on samples whenever s i = y i , where ξ > 0. At iteration t, the solution c t of the empirical risk minimization (5) identifies a sub-population G t = {x|c t (x) = 1} with a δ(c t )− violation of differential fairness, with δ ≥ ln((1 − h(ξt))/h(ξt)), where h is an increasing function. The Algorithm 1 terminates whenever either |G t | ≤ α. At the second to the last iteration T , theorem 3.5 guarantees that Algorithm 1 will identify a sub-population G T with a δ T -multi differential fairness violation and δ T asymptotically close to δ m . 
mdfa Auditor
Putting the building blocks together allows us to design a fairness diagnostic tool mdfa that identifies efficiently the most severe violation of differential unfairness.
Architecture Inputs are a dataset with a classifier's outcomes (labels ±1) along with auditing features. mfda first uses a neural network with four fully connected layers of 8 neurons to express the weights u as a function of the features x and minimizes the maximum-mean discrepancy function
The outputs of the last hidden layer in the neural network are used as a feature mapping φ and serve along the estimated weights u as an input to the empirical minimization Eq. (6), which outputs a certificate (c, y, s) ∈ C×{−1, 1}×S of unfairness. The weights are re-adjusted until the identified worst-case violation has a size smaller than α. When terminating, mdfa outputs an estimate of the most-harmed subpopulation c m along with an estimate of δ m .
Cross-Validation
The auditor chooses the minimum size α of the worst-case violation they would like to identify. The advantage of our approach is that, although we do not have ground truth for unfair treatment, we can propose heuristics to cross-validate our choice of regularization parameters used in Eq. (6). First, we split 70%/30% the input data into a train and test set. Using a 5−fold cross-validation, mdfa is trained on four folds and a grid search looks for regularization parameters that minimize the maximum-mean-discrepancŷ G k (u, s) and the empirical risk on the fifth fold. Once mdfa is trained, the estimated δ m and the corresponding characteristics of the most-harmed sub-population are computed on the test set.
Experimental Results

Synthetic Data
A synthetic data is constructed by drawing independently two features X 1 and X 2 from two normal distributions N (0, 1).
We consider a binary protected attribute S = {−1, 1} drawn from a Bernouilli distribution with S = 1 with probability
1+e µ * (x 1 +x 2 )) 2 . µ is the imbalance factor. µ = 0 means that the data is perfectly balanced.
The data is labeled according to the sign of (X 1 + X 2 + e) 3 , where is e is a noise drawn from N (0, 0.2). The audited classifier f is a logistic regression classifier that is altered to generate instances of differential unfairness. For x 2 1 +x 2 2 ≤ 1, if S = −1, the classifier's outcomes Y is changed from −1 to 1 with probability 1 − ν ∈ (0, 1]; if S = 1, all Y = −1 are changed to Y = 1. For ν = 0, the audited classifier is differentially fair; however, as ν increases, in the half circle {(x 1 , x 2 )|x Results First, we test whether Algorithm 1 identifies correctly the worst-case violation that occurs in the sub-space {(x 1 , x 2 )|x 2 1 + x 2 2 ≤ 1 and y = −1}. mdfa is trained using a support vector machine (RBF kernel) on a unbalanced data (µ = 0.2) with value of δ m varying from 0 to 3.0. Figure 1a plots the estimatedδ m against the true one δ m and shows that mdfa's estimateδ m is unbiased. Figure 1b shows that at each iteration of the Algorithm 1, the estimated worstcase violationδ m progresses toward the true value δ m . Secondly, we compare our balancing approach M M D to alternative re-balancing approaches: (i) uniform weights (U W ) with u(x) = 1/m for all x and (ii) importance sampling (IS) with exact weights w(x). U W applies mdfa without rebalancing. IS uses oracle access to the importance sampling weights w, since they are known in this synthetic experiment. Figure 1c plots the biasγ − γ for each unfairness certificate obtained by mdfa with varying values of the imbalance factor µ. It shows that minimizing the maximum-mean discrepancy function is the only method that generates unbiased certificates regardless of data imbalance. Bias in estimates obtained with U W confirms that absent of a re-weighting scheme, mdfa cannot disentangle the information related to S leaked by the features x from the one leaked by the classifier's outcomes y. Using importance sampling weights (IS) directly does not perform well: this confirms previous observations in the literature that in finite sample, the variance of the importance sample weights can be detrimental to a re-balancing approach. Lastly, Figure 1d shows that mdfa's estimates of δ m are robust to diverse classes of classifiers, including support vector machines with non-linear SV M − RBF or linear SV M − Lin kernels and random forest RF .
Case Study: COMPAS
We apply our method to the COMPAS algorithm, widely used to assess the likelihood of a defendant to become a recidivist ([ProPublica, 2016] Certifying the Lack of Differential Fairness We assess whether mdfa finds unfairness certificates by running only one iteration of algorithm 1 on 100 different 70/30% train/test splits. The assessment is made for two binary sensitive attributes: whether an individual self-identifies as AfroAmerican; and, whether an individual self-identifies as Male. Table 1 reports the unfairness level γ for each of those subgroups: a value significantly larger than zero indicates the existence of sub-populations where similar individuals are treated differently by COMPAS. In the first row of Table 1 , we use prior felonies (I), degree of current charges (II), age (III), juvenile felonies (IV) and misdemeanors (V) as auditing features. We find a significant level of differential unfairness in the COMPAS risk classification (γ = 0.024 ± 004) if the binary sensitive attribute is race. On the other hand, we do not find any evidence of differential unfairness when the sensitive attribute is gender. The results are robust to different choices for the auditing features, although standard deviations are higher when using only prior felonies (I) and degree of current charges (II).
Worst Violations We run mdfa on 100 different 70/30% train/test splits and report average value of auditing features and recidivism risk for the whole population and the worstcase subpopulation in Table 2 . The first two columns show that the distribution of features in the whole population is disperse and differs between African American (AA) and Other. This is due to the data imbalance issue (c.f. Section 3). The probability of being classified as high risk is 0.14 for AfricanAmerican, thereby 2.7 times higher than for non-African American. However, it is unclear whether that difference could be explained either by the distribution imbalance or by the classifier's disparate treatment. The two last columns in Table 2 show that in the sub-population "violation" extracted by mdfa, the distribution of features is narrower and similar for African-American and non-African American: the subpopulation is made of individuals with little criminal and misdemeanor history. However, African American are still three times more likely to be classified as high risk. A policy implication of mdfa findings is that a judge using COMPAS may discount its assessment for African-American with little criminal history.
Group Fairness vs. Multi-Differential Fairness
We evaluate whether previous fairness correcting approaches protect small group of individuals against violation of differential fairness. We consider two techniques: (i) [Feldman et al., 2015] 's disparate impact with a logistic classification (DI − LC) and (ii) [Agarwal et al., 2018] 's reduction with a logistic classification (Red − LC). We use mdfa to identify sub-population G with worst-case violations and measure disparate treatment as
We compare DT G to its aggregate counterpart computed on the whole population
Data The experiment is carried on three datasets from [Friedler et al., 2018; Kearns et al., 2018] ): Adult with 48840 individuals; German with 1000 individuals; and, Crimes with 1994 communities. In Adult the prediction task is whether an individual's income is less than 50K and the sensitive attribute is gender; in German, the prediction task is whether an individual has bad credit and the sensitive attribute is gender; in Crimes, the task is to predict whether a community is in the 70 th percentile for violent crime rates and the sensitive attribute is whether the percentage of African American is at least 20%. For each data, each repair technique produces a prediction; then, mdfa is trained on 70% of the data and computes estimates for disparate treatment DT G on the remaining 30% of the data. The experiment is repeated with 100 train/test splits. Table 3 , even despite the fairness correction applied by DI − LC and Red − LC, mdfa still finds subpopulations G for which DT G is significantly larger than one. It indicates the existence of group of individuals who are similar but for their sensitive attributes and who are treated differently by the classifier trained by either DI−LC or Red−LC. The repair techniques reduce the aggregate disparate impact compared to the baseline (LC), since DI is closer to one for DI − LC and Red − LC across all datasets. However, in the Adult dataset, DT G remains between 1.44 and 1.6 after repair: mdfa identifies a group G of Females that are 44% − 60% more likely to be of low-income than Males with similar characteristics. In Crimes dataset, disparate treatment DT G is around 5.7 for both DI − LC, R − LC: this means that there exist communities with dense African-American populations that are six times more likely to be classified at high risk than similar communities with lower percentages of African Americans.
Results In
In Table 4 , we identifies the average characteristics of the worst-case violation sub-population G in the Adults dataset. For brevity, we report the results for the logistic classifier without repair LC and with [Agarwal et al., 2018] 's reduction repair Red − LC. Similar results can be obtained for DI − LC. Compared to the overall populations, for both LC and Red − LC, individuals in the worst-case violation subpopulation work more hours/week, are older and have more years of education. Women in that group are 60%−80% more likely to be classified as low-income by LC or Red − LC than men with the same high level of education, same hours of work per week and same age.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present mdfa, a tool that measures whether a classifier treats differently individuals with similar auditing features but different sensitive attributes. We hope that mdfa's ability to identify sub-populations with severe violations of differential fairness could inform decision-makers when to discount the classifier's outcomes. It also provides the victims with a framework to contest a classifier's outcomes.
Avenues for future research are to investigate (i) the properties of a classifier trained under a multi-differential fairness constraint; and, (ii) the possibility to extend our approach to re-balance distributions in order to make counterfactual inference [Johansson et al., 2016] in the context of algorithmic fairness.
6 Appendix Lemma 3.1
Proof. Denote x, x ′ the inner product between x and x ′ . Observe that for r = ± the left-hand side in Eq. (4) can be written
for any x, x ′ ∈ {−1, 1}. The result from lemma 3.1 follows by remarking that S, 1 = S, c = 2P
by lemma 3.1, c * is a γ-unfairness certificate, with γ = opt+ρ−1 4
and ρ = P r[o i = 1]. By (i), the certifying algorithm outputs a (γ − ǫ/4)− unfairness certificate c ∈ C with probability 1 − η and O(log(|C, log(
Suppose that f is a γ-unfair. Denote y i = f (x i , s i ). Samples {(x i , s i ), y i } are drawn from a balanced distribution over X × S × {−1, 1}. By lemma 3.1, there exists c ∈ C such that P r[c(x i ) = s i y i ] = 4γ + 1 − ρ r , with r = ±. Assume, without loss of generality r = +. Then, since max c ′ P r[c(x i ) = s i y i ] ≥ 4γ + 1 − ρ + . By (ii), there exists an algorithm that outputs with probability 1−η and O(log(|C, log( Proof. First, note that G k (u, w) = (u − w) T k(u − w) and by a standard bound on Rayleigh quotient, ||u − w|| ≤ G k (u, w)/ λ min (k).
Now we prove lemma 3.3:
Proof. The proof relies on the fact that the solution of Eq. (5) is distributionally stable as in [Cortes et al., 2008] :
where λ max (k) is the largest eigenvalue of the Gram matrix associated to k (see [Cortes et al., 2008] , proof of theorem 1). Moreover, |h u (x) − h w (x)| ≤ ||h u − h w || k . The result in lemma 3.3 follows from lemma 6.1 and cond(k) = λ max (k)/λ min (k).
The next result follows from [Gretton et al., 2009] and bounds aboveĜ k (u, w s ), the emprical counterpart of G k (u, w s ), where w s (x) = P r[S = s|x]/(1 − P r[S = s|x]) are the importance sampling weights for S = s. Lemma 6.2. Let η > 0. Denote n s = |{i = 1, ..., m|s i = s}| and n s = |{i = 1, ..., m|s i = s}|. Suppose that ||u|| ∞ < B/n s and that E[u] < ∞. There exists a constant κ 1 > 0 such that with probability 1 − η,
Proof. See [Gretton et al., 2009 ] Lemma 1.5
For τ > 0, we construct c ∈ C from the real-valued function h as
Lemma 6.3. Let τ, η > 0, ǫ > 0. Letĉ u ,ĉ w denote the certificates constructed from the solution of the empirical risk minimizationĥ u (with weights u) andĥ w (with weights w s ). There exists κ 2 > 0 such that with probability 1 − η,
ns + 1 n¬s , with
. By lemma ?? and lemma 6.2, ||ĥ u −ĥ w || 2 ≤ ǫ m with probability 1 − η. Consider first the caseĥ w < −τ . Then, with probability 1 − η,
. A similar result is obtained for h w > τ . . Lastly, with probability 1 − η,
5τ . The first part of the inequality uses the results obtained in the previous paragraph for |ĥ u | > τ ; the second part uses the construction ofĉ u andĉ w . Therefore, with probability
The last result we need to prove theorem 3.4 is to link n s and n ¬s to sample size m Lemma 6.5. Denote α s = P r[S = s]. Let ǫ, η > 0.
, with probability
Proof. This is an application of a Hoeffding's inequality for Bernouilly random variable.
The proof of theorem 3.4 then follows from the observation that for a sample balanced with weights u,γ u = P r[ĉ u = 1] There exists κ 3 such that for ǫ > 0, with probability 1 − η, |γ u −γ w | ≤ κ 3 ǫ. Moreover, by theorem 3.2, if C has finite VC dimension, with probability 1 − η and Ω log(|C|), 
where u it are the weights at iteration t and the expectation is taken over all the samples of size m drawn from D f . 1 + e δ(ct) − 1 2 = γ.
The algorithm stops when P r[Y = 1, c t = 1] = α, which implies δ t = δ m . Therefore, t ≤ T .
